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Abstract: The paper addresses the question of how Operations Research ought to 
handle decision problems that involve value conflicts. First, we note that early OR was 
essentially value free with a mechanistic systems perspective, although some voiced 
concern that an analyst should not detach herself from the consequences of her work. 
Then we propose a value conflict scale, which we use to assess the conflict levels in a 
small sample of OR applications. We then turn to value identification. In practise, 
organizational value statements include many kinds of values, and we discuss how 
values can be sorted out according to ethical categories, which helps in identifying 
consequentialistic decision criteria. The next question is how values can be enacted in a 
decision process. We review findings in neuroscience, which indicate that intra-
personal decision-making takes place in a field of tension between deliberation and 
affect, the implication being that low level conflicts leave decision-makers too coldly 
rational and therefore want infusion of emotion, while emotions in high-level conflicts 
need to be tempered. Emotions can be tempered through two strategies: focus on 
consequences rather than virtues and rules, and discourse ethics, which are the subjects 
of the two last parts. We conclude by proposing five ethical rules for OR analysis of 
value conflicts. An analyst should: Not regard herself as being detached from the 
decision that are made; be conscious that good decision-making requires temperate 
emotions that balance affect and deliberation; promote focus on consequences; promote 
the view that stakeholders have intrinsic value, they should not be treated 
instrumentally; encourage fair processes to identify stakeholder values. 
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1. Introduction 
How can Operations Research (OR) handle ethical questions? Or more precisely: 
what role can OR play in the analysis of decision problems that involve conflicts of 
value, and can OR contribute to a more ethical approach to such problems? These are 
the general questions we want to address, and we will approach them through a 
somewhat winding pathway that touches on the nature of OR as well as essential 
issues in ethics. We hope this may contribute to the development of an ethical 
paradigm for OR approaches to value conflicts. 
Two current, but separate developments prompt our discussion: i) value statements on 
the web[1], and ii) the emerging field of neuroeconomics[2]. For a start, let us note 
that value is a central concept in OR; one might indeed argue that it is the central 
concept since OR is dedicated to maximising value in one form or other – be it one-
dimensional maximisation or multi-dimensional value trade-off. Specific ethical 
issues in OR are therefore to identify what is of value, and to help enact the values in 
decision-making processes. Our basic tenet is that value statements and 
neuroeconomics are important pieces in a picture of an OR paradigm that incorporates 
ethics. 
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Organizations today make increasing efforts at stating values on their web-based 
home pages.[1, 3] Stated values are most frequently core values that describe the code 
of conduct. Examples are integrity, honesty and respect. But value statements contain 
other types of value as well, for instance values that are created by the organization 
and thus consequences of operations, such as return on investment (ROI). Value 
statements may also include values they want to protect, such as environmental 
values. Value statements in practise tend to be quite entangled, however; a better 
structure would make them better suited for decision making purposes. 
The other phenomenon is the emerging field of moral cognitive neuroscience[4] and 
its offshoot neuroeconomics[2] that provides us with new knowledge of intrapersonal 
decision processes, illuminating the roles of deliberation, affect and emotion. The 
classical Cartesian view of decision-making as an entirely reasoned process free of 
emotional interference, where the decision-maker deliberates over the consequences 
of alternative actions and chooses the one that looks best, is now under attack, and the 
evidence points in the direction that intra-personal decision-making takes place in a 
field of tension between the competing forces of affect and deliberation, where 
emotions play a central role and therefore must be included in any paradigm of ethical 
decision-making. 
The paper is structured as follows: 
1. Original value paradigm of OR: We review the position of values in an early 
version of the OR paradigm, and note that it was essentially value free with a 
mechanistic systems perspective, although some voiced concern that an 
analyst should not detach herself from the consequences of her work. 
2. A value conflict scale: We propose a value conflict scale that benchmarks 
conflict level potential according to how intrinsic the values are and degree of 
stakeholder involvement. 
3. Values in contemporary OR: We examine recent issues of the journal Omega 
and notes that the value conflicts that are analysed are generally, but not 
exclusively, low level. 
4. Value structuring: Organizational values can be classified into three categories 
– core values, created values, and protected values – that parallel the classical 
ethical categories of virtue, consequence and duty. 
5. Enactment of values: Findings in neuroscience indicate that intra-personal 
decision-making takes place in a field of tension between deliberation and 
affect. The implication is that low level conflicts leave decision-makers too 
coldly rational and therefore want infusion of emotion, while emotions in 
high-level conflicts need to be tempered. 
6. OR, consequentialism and ethics: We propose that OR ought to promote 
consequentialism with infusion of emotion as an ethical approach to decision 
problems. 
7. Discourse ethics: We describe discourse ethics as a recommendable approach 
under strong value conflicts. 
8. Conclusion: Finally, we propose a list of rules as elements of an ethical 
paradigm for OR analysis of value conflicts. 
2. The original value paradigm of OR 
In his seminal work Principles of Operations Research [5], Harvey Wagner (1969) 
defines OR as “a scientific approach to problem-solving for executive management” 
that involves “Constructing mathematical, economic, and statistical descriptions or 
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models of decision and control problems to treat situations of complexity and 
uncertainty” and “Analyzing the relationships that determine the probable future 
consequences of decision choices, and devising appropriate measures of effectiveness 
in order to evaluate the relative merit of alternative actions.” Its distinguishing 
features are according to Wagner (p.5-6): 
− A primary focus on Decision Making 
− An appraisal resting on Economic Effectiveness Criteria. A comparison of the 
various feasible actions must be based on measurable values that 
unequivocally reflect the future well-being of the organization. In a 
commercial firm, these measured quantities typically include variable cost, 
revenues, cash flow, and rate of return on incremental investment. A 
recommended solution must have evaluated the trade-offs and have struck an 
optimum balance among these sometimes conflicting factors. 
− Reliance on a Formal Mathematical Model. The procedures for manipulating 
the data should be so explicit that they can be described to another analyst, 
who in turn would derive the same results from the same data. 
 
Thus, the principles of OR appear from the beginning to emphasize pure, objective 
deliberation; emotion and feeling are at best not mentioned, at worst externalized. The 
fact that Wagner explicitly states that OR needs to take different objectives into 
account, does not amount to a call for incorporation of subjective judgment, since he 
implicitly assumes that the objectives can be traded off in an objective way as 
elements in a corporate “well-being” function. If an organization has only one goal, 
i.e. to maximize profit, and it is possible to develop a causal model that leads from 
decision to goal attainment, then obviously the computation of an optimal decision 
can be left to machines, and there is neither place, nor need for emotions. The point is 
that the economic effectiveness criteria that Wagner mentions are not in true value 
conflict in a moral sense: they are all means to one goal and do not represent intrinsic 
values; if the mechanisms were known, the problem would be one of mathematics. 
Thus, Wagner’s concept of OR is apparently that of a science for development of 
mathematical methods that ultimately maximize one-dimensional value. His decision 
criteria (economic effectiveness criteria) are only instruments that are valuable insofar 
as they contribute to the main goal.  
The philosopher C. West Churchman stands in opposition to this cold view of OR, 
however. This is from his plenary talk at the MCDM conference in 1969: 
“The researcher would like to remain apart, to observe and analyze objectively. The 
moral question is whether he has any right to do so...When research comes to the 
point of making a conclusion, it does so in a cold phlegmatic manner, devoid of any 
of the joys, angers, hopes and fears that may have occurred during the research 
process. The phlegmatic might be called the mood apperception of the research 
reporting style. But morality always exists outside the phlegmatic. It is choleric 
joyful, sad, indignant, furious. Morality’s mood apperception is therefore quite 
different from research's. ..Research needs to become more general in its moods if it 
intends to study morality. Instead of asking the phlegmatic question, how many 
people agree with such and such a moral prescription, the researcher should ask 
himself about a certain act from a moral point of view. Does it anger him to realize 
that a group of people are being exploited by someone?  I am appealing to your moral 
indignation...”[6] 
  
Accordingly, OR has increasingly been addressing decision problems with truer value 
conflicts – such as moral conflicts and stakeholder conflicts, where in principle it is 
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impossible to reduce the maximization problem to a one-dimensional value function 
without subjective judgment of the values at stake. We will return to the current status 
of values in OR when we have looked at how value conflicts can be benchmarked. 
3. A value conflicts scale 
Value conflict potential is easier to discuss if we have a scale, and we propose to 
benchmark conflict potential according to two dimensions: The degree to which the 
decision criteria represent intrinsic rather than instrumental values, and the extent of 
stakeholder involvement. The assumption is that if the decision criteria are only 
technical means to further ends, they are probably less likely to create conflicts than if 
they represent ends that people easily attach value to. Further, it makes a difference 
whether the decision is made on behalf of people – such as in a board room, or 
whether they participate in the process, which we presume makes the conflict 
potential higher. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting levels, which are explained in the 
text. 
 
Figure 1: Conflict level potential as a function of stakeholder involvement and the degree to 
which the decision criteria represent intrinsic rather than instrumental values. 
 
− Level 0: At this lowest level, there is no true value conflict. There is only one 
stakeholder goal, and it is possible to derive an objective functional 
relationship between the goal and the decision criteria, which are technical 
instruments. Any apparent conflict between decision criteria can therefore be 
solved with mathematical means, and there is no occasion for emotions or 
feelings – nor indeed for a DM. This is Wagner’s original concept of OR.  
− Level 1: We have only one stakeholder goal, and the decision criteria are 
instrumental in nature. The functional relationship from the criteria to the goal 
is not objectively known, however, making it necessary for a DM to decide on 
appropriate trade-offs among conflicting criteria based on tacit knowledge or 
intuition. Thus, in order to decide the DM has to lean this way or other, the 
leaning probably being prompted by emotions. But since the decision problem 
is technical and not moral in nature, we would not expect emotions to be 
strong. Although different analysts in principle would agree on the same 
consequence model, different DMs might still arrive at different decisions. 
Applications of the balanced scorecard approach fit in this category.[7] 
− Level 2: We have several stakeholders that do not participate actively in the 
decision process and the decision criteria are of instrumental nature. Such 
decision problems are quite common in environmental management.[8] 
Suppose for instance that a DM must decide on a fuel tax system for cars that 
will benefit either diesel oil or gasoline. There are two decision criteria: 
emission of particulates and emission of CO2, which are in conflict since 
diesel oil is the culprit with regard to particulates and gasoline with regard to 
CO2. These decision criteria are only instrumental, however; the intrinsic 
values lie further down the impact pathway and have to do with health, 
aesthetics and global temperature. Emotions may run high in such cases, but 
not as high as they might if intrinsic values were used as decision criteria. One 
is more likely to be emotionally aroused by a sickly child than by a ton of 
CO2. 
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− Level 3: We have several stakeholder goals and the decision criteria are of 
intrinsic value but the stakeholders do not participate actively in the decision 
process. For instance, the board of directors must decide on dividends for 
shareholders as well as salary rise for employees. Emotions will usually run 
high in such clear value conflicts, and decision may be termed morally good or 
bad. An OR example is reported in [9] where alternative HIV strategies in 
Norway where studied with a System Dynamics consequence model, followed 
up by a multi-criteria analysis with a panel consisting of the three top national 
DMs. The stakeholders were immigrants, prostitutes, male homosexuals, 
future AIDS victims, etc. Although their values were included in the decision 
criteria, none of them participated actively. 
− Level 4: We have several stakeholder goals and the decision criteria represent 
intrinsic values, with stakeholders participating actively in the decision 
process. The lawsuit ‘Anderson et al v Pacific Gas & Electric’ is a memorable 
example of that kind of conflict. The case alleged contamination of drinking 
water with hexavalent chromium in a town in southern California. At stake 
was company profit versus local inhabitants’ health. It was settled in 1996 for 
$333 million, the largest settlement ever paid in a direct action lawsuit in US 
history, and made memorable by the emotional film “Erin Brockovich”. 
Negotiation is a typical example of conflict resolution with intrinsic values 
and participating stakeholders, but negotiations are usually governed by rules 
that reduce the conflict level. We will return to that in part 8. 
4. Values in contemporary OR 
The field of MCDA [10] is a branch of OR and dedicated to decision problems with 
several conflicting decision criteria. Judging from the nature of contributions to its 
main outlet, the Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, MCDA practitioners 
share to some degree the heart and mind of OR-people with their preference for 
mathematical modeling, but there is also a noticeable softer touch that hangs together 
with an explicit concern for values.[11] MCDA papers are published in traditional OR 
journals such as Omega as well. We have reviewed the most recent issues (1-5) of 
volume 35 (2007) of that journal, and found that eight papers out of a total of 41 
addressed multi-criteria decision problems. The 33 “one-dimensional” papers do not 
discuss what value to optimize – it is taken as given, and the value conflict level may 
safely be assumed to be zero. But what of the MCDA papers? – What is the nature of 
the values that enter those analyses, and what can be said about the value conflict 
levels? The eight papers from our convenience sample are of course not representative 
in a statistical sense, but they may serve to convey the flair of what MCDA 
applications in OR journals are like. Let us therefore have a brief look at them. 
The decision context in [12] is for a firm to select the best supplier, and the decision 
criteria are: technical level, number of defects, reliability, on-time delivery, supply 
capacity, repair turnaround-time, and warranty period. In  [13] the decision context is 
selection of tool steel material, and the criteria are: nondeforming properties, safety in 
hardening, toughness, resistance to softening, wear resistance for materials, 
machinability and cost. In these two applications we have one goal, and the decision 
criteria are instrumental, which should correspond to value conflict level 1. 
Paper [14] studies choice of country for global manufacturing, and uses a large 
number of criteria: costs, high school enrolment, attitude of unionization, supplier 
reliability, people speaking English, political stability, GDP growth rate, currency 
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issuer credit rating, inflation rate, corruption perceptions, unemployment level, 
membership FTA, infrastructure quality, and regional vehicle production. Here, we 
may discern several stakeholders, but the criteria appear to more instrumental than 
intrinsic, which points in direction of value conflict level 2. 
Selection of business partnership is the topic of [15], and the criteria are: price of the 
product; quality of the product; financial stability and quality of customer service. The 
next [16] is another selection problem, this time of a global supplier, and the criteria 
are: cost, quality, service performance, supplier’s profile and risk factor. Paper [17] 
studies aggregate production planning, and the criteria are: profit, number of late 
orders, and work force level changes, which are all clear intrinsic stakeholder values. 
Locating facilities strategically is the topic of [18], and the criteria are: price, quality, 
delivery, flexibility. In all these papers, there is an emphasis on stakeholders, but they 
do not participate in the process, and the value conflict potential is on level 3. 
All the papers mentioned above employ rather sophisticated quantitative methods, and 
it is fair to say that there is seldom moral conflict among the criteria. But there are 
examples of stakeholder conflicts that may amount to moral conflicts, such as 
between customer service and financial stability in [15], and profit and work force 
level changes in [17]. In all of them, the DM has to provide some kind of opinion or 
information regarding the importance of the criteria, as they contribute to the well-
being of the firm, or perhaps as loci of intrinsic value in the case of stakeholders. The 
underlying assumption is that the mechanisms of instrumental criteria are not 
precisely known – otherwise it would be no need for a DM – but the DM is supposed 
to have a cognitive grasp of them, which enables her to lean one way or other in 
choice situations. We shall in the section on neuroeconomics argue that emotions are 
key elements in the internal processes that prompt the DM to act, and if they are 
altogether absent, decisions will be literary senseless. In the studies cited above, it is 
perhaps reasonable to expect DM emotions to be feeble in cases that involve 
instrumental criteria, and stronger when intrinsic values are at stake. 
Let us then turn to the last of the eight papers, which is rather different from the ones 
above. The title is “Voices and values: Linking values with participation in OR/MS in 
public policy making” and it deals with hospital planning [19]. They used a problem 
structuring method (PSM)[20], which is softer and more process oriented than more 
conventional OR methods. DMs, politicians as well as local people were engaged in a 
process to bring forth values and trade-offs. The following values were identified: for 
service providers to be democratic, to have an inclusive but also efficient process. The 
group discussed the need for a trade-off between being open and inclusive, and 
minimizing the length of time for conducting the process. This OR application differ 
from the ones above, and indeed in most of the OR literature: whereas most 
applications use decision criteria that describe consequences of decisions, this one 
focuses on the decision-making process itself and uses as decision criteria virtues like 
democratic, open, inclusive and efficient – but also length of time, which is a 
consequence of the chosen process. The study reports active and emotional 
engagement by the stakeholders, which puts it at level 4 on the value conflict scale. 
The general picture is that OR has a preference for decision problems without value 
conflicts; and if there are value conflicts, low conflict levels are preferred. This 
underscores the urgency of our original question about what role OR can play 
regarding conflicts of value, and whether can OR contribute to a more ethical 
approach to such problems? 
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5. Structuring value statements 
We want to propose a generic value structure that is helpful for organizing 
organizational value statements on the Web as well as useful for OR-assisted 
decision-making. Let us start by seeing what classical ethical theories have to offer, 
and then look at the OR concept of value before we proceed to web-based value 
statements. 
5.1 Classical ethical theories  
The three classical ethical theories: consequentialism, duty ethics, and virtue ethics 
espouse different sorts of value; and these may prove useful as a basis for structuring 
value statements.  
According to consequentialism[21], an action is morally good if the intended 
consequences are good. Consequentialism makes the good prior to the right, and it 
defines right operation in terms of promoting the good. If the good is defined as 
pleasure, this is hedonism, if as happiness, eudemonism.[22] Thus, a consequentialist 
looks neither at the nature of the action itself, nor at the character or attitude of the 
DM: only consequences count. So a consequentialistic conception of duty is inclined 
to identify duty as an action to promote the good, an further classify virtuous 
dispositions as those with good consequences.[23] This contrasts with Kantian duty 
ethics that defines the right prior to the good. The principle of morality according to 
Immanuel Kant is to act only on that maxim through which you at the same time will 
that I should become a universal law. It considers whether the DM has obeyed the 
right principles, and thereby fulfilled her duty or obligations. Finally, virtue ethics is 
only concerned with the character and attitude of the DM: an action is morally right if 
the relevant virtues have been displayed, such as courage, loyalty etc. To be 
principled is also a virtue, and this provides a link between duty and virtue ethics: to 
fail at duty ethics is to fail at virtue ethics. 
Classical ethical theories, then, provide us with three different categories for moral 
judgment of actions: consequences, principles and virtues: Do we expect good 
consequences from the action? Are our principles observed? Is the action virtuous? 
In our survey, almost all decision criteria were consequences. For instance ‘product 
price’, ‘product quality’, ‘financial stability’ and ‘quality of customer service’ are all 
supposedly consequences of operations, but they are not values in a moral sense. As 
Keeney has pointed out, consequences are in a sense value free, they are not good or 
bad in themselves. It is the DM that gives them direction by specifying whether they 
are to be minimized or maximized [24]. Whether the price is to be minimized or 
maximized depends on whose value it represents. Virtues are different: being 
democratic, open and inclusive is good. From an organizational point of view, 
principles would be standards, rules and regulations that the organization has chosen 
to follow, such as safety procedures, environmental standards etc. 
5.2 Morals versus ethics 
The terms “morals” and “ethics” are often blended instead of being defined 
exclusively. We think a distinction between the two terms is elucidating and useful.  
If “morals” is defined at group level and “ethics” at a higher level, both terms are still 
oriented about right and wrong, but moral is seen as privatized. Like many groups 
there are many morals and many subcultures, and in a pluralistic society one cannot 
find common values within morals. A group may claim that with few privileges and 
low salaries they also need some advantages within society – a few compared to 
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privileged groups – and therefore hold it for reasonable to dodge on public 
transportation. Yet, when each stakeholder holds a privatized moral, this creates 
conflict rather than consensus. Though members respect one another within the group 
by providing support and defense against conflicting values, this demonstrates a 
fundamental difference between in-group and out-group morality. Ethics may be seen 
as a decision-making procedure that is accepted by the stakeholders[25]. This ties 
ethics to dialogue, and to arguments. Further ethics is not guided by money or power, 
and finally reason and action is inclusive, rather than exclusive. This precludes that 
parties do not reject each other, and at the same time do not lean back when knowing 
what the other party wants. A dialogue presumes that none of the parties insist on 
one’s own values or a break through by money or power.  It is presumed that each 
party listen to the arguments of the other party and respond to them, in a way that 
replaces one’s private morality with shared ethics. 
On this background we find a perspective with ethics and OR of interest rather than 
OR and morals. 
5.3 The OR concept of value 
One will probably not find a simple unanimous concept of value in the OR literature. 
But Keeney’s influential book[24]  on value focused thinking is a natural place to 
start. He considers values as “principles used for evaluation” – something we use to 
evaluate consequences of actions. According to Keeney, values are indicated by: 
− Ethics: “Do not exploit the misfortunes of others.” 
− Traits: “It is important to be trustworthy, loyal and dependable.” 
− Characteristics: “Any proposed national energy policy should be appraised in 
terms of national security, economic cost, environmental impacts, and health 
and safety.” 
− Guidelines: “It is better to try and fail than not try at all.” 
− Priorities: Safety is more important than economy when purchasing a car. 
− Value trade-offs 
− Attitudes towards risk  
We see that Keeney has reserved a rather small place for ethics as value. To have 
compassion for the suffering of others is an Aristotelian virtue, and so are 
trustworthiness, loyalty and dependability. If you are courageous, you will try even if 
you may fail. Thus the values Keeney lists as ethics, traits and guidelines can all be 
subsumed under virtues.  
With priorities, Keeney means attitudes where one concern goes before another, no 
matter what. Such concerns can be linked to values that Baron and Spranca have 
called protected values[26], where analysts usually fail at trying to cajole their 
decision-makers into making value trade-offs. Fairness, rights issues and 
environmental concerns are typical areas where this happens. 
Keeney’s characteristics are consequences of actions, not necessarily intended, but 
everything we normally would list concerning values that would be created or 
destroyed by the action. The consequences represent the objectives for the decision 
problem; what motivates the decision-making in the first place, but also conflicting 
values that should be taken into account. The consequences are what you would look 
at if after the decision was made and the actions taken and the dust settled, you were 
to assess whether it had indeed been a good decision.  Keeney recommends that we 
create the list of values through development of a goal hierarchy, and it is interesting 
to note almost all examples of goal hierarchies in his book have values that are neither 
virtues, nor protected values. 
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So far we have classified Keeney’s values as virtues, protected values and 
consequences or created values, but what of value trade-offs and attitudes towards 
risk? They are in a sense different; they certainly play a key role in the decision-
making process, but instead of having to do with what is of value, they pertain to how 
valuable the objectives are. This depends on the attitude and, yes – values of the DM, 
but we now talk about value strength, not what to attribute value to. The same can to 
some extent be said about attitudes towards risk, although such concerns can also be 
described in terms of consequences (like beta in finance) of virtues like carefulness. 
Organizational value statements are about what the organization value, and therefore 
virtues, protected values as well as created values should be included, but to state how 
to allocate value in decision contexts would be difficult and in most cases put undue 
restrictions on the DM. 
Tsoukiàs[27] accepts the three classes of values above, using the slightly different 
terminology of ‘norms, values and rules’. But he insists that all reasons for choice 
should be included in the decision process and that it is the task of any decision-aiding 
methodology to facilitate that: “A decision aiding methodology cannot limit itself in 
considering a certain type of reasoning (deontic, value based, heuristic or normative). 
It has to be able to consider any reason.” 
However, when we look at the OR literature, even a glimpse like the one above 
reveals that it is overwhelmingly focused on consequences. Brugha[28] thinks that 
Keeny and Raiffa set this pattern in their seminal work from 1976 on multi-criteria 
decision-making[10], where they deliberately used the term attribute instead of 
decision criterion. However, an attribute is a quality or feature and therefore more 
restricted than decision criterion, which again is more restricted than reason. To use 
Brugha’s words, “restricting oneself to attributes tends to highlight the obvious and 
tangible, and marginalize the vague and speculative. So, if only one of the alternatives 
was a cause of some ethical doubts, such an attribute might not get into the list that 
would be used in the measurement phase.” Keeney sticks to this terminology in his 
1992 book on value focused thinking[24], although he admits that there different 
traditions and that the term decision criterion is quite widely used as well. A glance 
through his book reveals that attributes measure consequences of decisions, neither 
features of the decision process, nor conflicts with laws or regulations. The decision 
criteria of the first seven Omega papers cited above are all attributes or consequences 
of the decisions. The exception is the eight, which uses other reasons as well. 
To sum up, the OR concept of value is in disarray. It encompasses our three value 
categories virtues, created values and protected values, and probably more. And 
although forceful voices argue that decision analysts should help include all reasons 
for the decision, OR in practice seems to emphasize consequences, and even further 
restrict itself to attributes that are measurable features of the alternatives. 
5.4 Value statements on the Web 
There is a striking difference between the OR concept of value and values that are 
stated on the Web-pages. While OR concentrates on created values, the first that 
meets the eye if one searches for ‘value’ on home-pages is a code of conduct or 
something to that effect, which emphasizes core values or virtues. One has to refine 
the search to find other values. Wenstøp and Myrmel[1] have made a survey of 
American companies listed on NYSE to find out to which degree companies state 
values on their web pages, and what kind of values are emphasized. The web pages 
were searched with keywords such as ‘corporate governance’, ‘ethics’, ‘values’, 
‘goals’, ‘social responsibility’, ‘community involvement’, ‘procedures’, 
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‘environmental involvement’, ‘stakeholder’, ‘shareholder’, ‘who we are’, 
‘commitment’ and ‘purpose’.  This led usually to value oriented sections that could be 
investigated more thoroughly. Value statements were often found at different sites in 
the web pages depending on the topic, e.g. financial goals, social responsibility and 
certification. Virtues were usually found in a section called codex, code of conduct, or 
core values. Created values were found by searching for statements focusing on the 
outcome of actions with keywords like ‘maximizing’, ‘profitability’ and ‘creating 
value’. Finally, protected values were looked for with keywords like ‘legal’, ‘ISO 
standards’, ‘safety’, ‘health’ and ‘certification’.  
It turned out that 77% of the companies stated created values, 54 % stated protected 
values and 67 % stated core values. The top six core values were integrity, honesty, 
respect, diversity, openness and fairness, in that order.  
5.5 A generic value structure 
Core values, created values and protected values are linked to the three classical 
ethical categories: virtues, consequences and principles. While it is fairly easy to 
allocate stated values to one of the three categories, Web-based value statements do 
not in general betray an awareness that they are of different kind and that they may 
play different roles in decision-making. We therefore think it is useful to structure 
them as shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Generic structure for organizational value statements on the Web. Adapted from 
Wenstøp and Myrmel [1] 
 
Core values, then, are virtues like integrity, honesty, respect, diversity, openness and 
fairness. Core values are the central element in a code of conduct that describes 
attitudes and how people should interact and is primarily a leadership tool that aims to 
create an organizational spirit to make it special. Core values are not natural parts of 
analytic decision-making models, but they certainly play important roles in real 
decision processes. 
Created values are the raison d’être of the organization – why the organization exist. 
These are typically values that are created for its stakeholders, like dividends for 
shareholders, salary for employees, workplaces for the local community, etc. In an 
OR context, it is natural to organize created values as a strategic goal hierarchy with a 
general objective on top, like ‘maximize the long term value of the firm’. For specific 
decision problems, one would then develop context a dependent goal hierarchy with 
decision criteria that are subject to value trade-offs. An important issue in this context 
is whether the stakeholders should be seen as loci of intrinsic value, or merely 
instruments for higher purposes. We support the Kantian position, which has strong 
support in the corporate responsibility literature, that people should not be treated as 
instruments.[29] 
Protected values are values that are protected by standards, rules and procedures. 
They are not subject to value trade-off. Health, environment and safety are the areas 
where the most typical examples are found. 
Are some values left out? Yes, in actual decision-making processes the values in the 
value system must be somehow enacted. They must be given valence or power to 
influence the decision. We do not think it is possible to prescribe the valence of 
values; that will depend on the decision context and the participants in the decision-
making process, and the main mechanisms to make that happen are emotions. 
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6. Enactment of values: affect and deliberation 
The emerging field of neuroeconomics study neural correlates of economic decision-
making. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec [2] have made an extensive review of the 
field, which builds on neuroscience. Different techniques monitor the location and 
pattern of neural activity in the brain when decisions are made. Brain imaging with 
the help of positron emission topography (PET) scanning and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) is currently much used, and has established firmly that 
there are two kinds of neural processes involved in all kinds of decision-making: 
cognitive and affective. This is hardly a surprise: already Plato described people as 
driving a chariot drawn by two horses, reason and passion. The field of economics, 
however, has traditionally concentrated on reason, keeping the passions at arm’s 
length. Neuroeconomics seeks to bring the passions back into the economic models to 
build more complete models of human decision processes, and we think this provides 
us with important pieces in a puzzle where affect, emotions, deliberation and reason 
all work together to shape ethics in decision-making. 
Affective states are emotional, meaning that they have somatic correlates; and all 
affective states have valence – being either positive or negative. Emotions need not be 
felt, however. In most normal situations, we are probably unconscious about our 
emotions, but they still convey action tendencies. Almost all actions seem to be 
prompted by emotions; they work to improve our affective state by giving the body 
signals of whether to approach or avoid. Neural processes without valence are not 
regarded as affects, and some of these – like reflexes – produce action as well. The 
interplay between affective processes in our brain and emotions in our body is 
massively parallel, with many pathways working simultaneously, and working fast. 
We may act before we have time to think. Examples of affective states are emotions 
such as anger, fear, and jealousy, as well as drive states such as hunger, thirst and 
sexual desire, and motivational states such as physical pain, and discomfort.  
While the affective system appears similar in humans and animals, the cognitive 
system sets us apart: cognitive processes are used in deliberate reasoning. They 
answer logical questions; predict consequences of actions, etc. One of the most 
compelling evidence for the existence of the two systems is reported by Sanfey et al. 
who monitored the brain activity of people that were considering offers in the 
ultimatum game.[30] In this game a person (A) is provided with an amount of money 
– usually $10 – that she is supposed to share with another (B) by making an offer of a 
part of it. If the B rejects the offer, neither will get anything. If B accepts the offer, the 
money will be split accordingly. Classical economic theory predicts low offers, say 
$1, which in turn will be accepted – B’s reasoning being that it is better to accept 
something than getting nothing. But this is not what happens. Most offers lie around 
$4 and are accepted; unfair offers – $2 or lower – are usually turned down. Moreover, 
fMRI scans of B’s brain activity show that people react differently to fair and unfair 
offers. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex – which is involved in planning – is active in 
both cases, but when unfair offers are made, the insula cortex is active as well. It is 
known to be active in connection with negative emotions like pain and disgust, and 
one interpretation is that unfair offers are turned down because people are disgusted 
by them – thus overriding deliberate value maximization in the cognitive system. 
However, the current view in neuroscience is that cognitive processes cannot produce 
action themselves. To achieve that, the cognitive system must work through the 
affective system.[2] The picture is therefore that the cognitive system is necessary for 
searching for options and predicting consequences, but it cannot evaluate those 
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consequences. That must be done by the affective system. Damasio[31] made early on 
notable empirical observations in neuroscience when he discovered that people with 
damage to the prefrontal lobes, were emotionally flat when they contemplated future 
consequences of decisions, and as a result were very poor decision-makers. He 
developed the so-called “somatic marker” theory where the brain is assumed to attach 
valence to the scenarios by comparing them to ‘markers’. This triggers a somatic 
reaction, which is felt, and the feeling then prompts action. In the words of Camerer et 
al.: “It is not enough to “know” what should be done; it is also necessary to “feel” it.” 
Figure 3 shows a model of the processes involved in decision making between affect 
and deliberation. 
 
Figure 3: A model of decision-making between affect and deliberation, adapted from 
Loewenstein and Lerner[32]. Path a: all decisions are prompted by immediate emotions. The 
pathway a-b-c-d is employed in deliberation, which involves prediction of consequences of 
alternative decisions and how good they will be. The expected emotions influence immediate 
emotions, which in turn may prompt action. Path e represents affect caused for instance by fear 
or disgust which may affect immediate emotions more strongly than expected emotions. 
 
For our purpose, this means that even at level 1 on our conflict scale, where we have 
only one stakeholder and instrumental decision criteria, elicitation of emotions is 
required (path c). If the decision-maker has not developed feelings for the expected 
consequences of the various options, her decisions are senseless and therefore 
arbitrary. Aside from conflict level zero where no real decision-making take place, 
level 1 is the most common conflict level in OR applications, and we see that even 
these – or rather especially these applications – require adequate attention to 
emotions, or else decisions will be irresponsible and therefore unethical.  
What is the current practice then in OR applications to value conflicts? In our sample, 
none of the papers appears to pay attention to this side of the decision process, and 
this is cause for concern. To make it possible for decision-makers to enact values, OR 
needs to become more conscious about producing vivid scenarios of consequences to 
elicit emotions.[33]  
While emotions are needed in all decision situations, what happens when we move up 
the conflict level scale? Greene et al. [34] have used fMRI scanning to investigate 
brain activity when people responded to dilemmas that were either non-moral, moral-
impersonal or moral-personal. Examples of non-moral dilemmas were whether to 
travel by bus or train given certain time constraints; a moral impersonal question was 
whether to keep money found in a lost wallet, and a moral-personal question was 
whether to throw people off a sinking life boat, i.e. to sacrifice one in order to save 
many. The results showed that the activity in brain areas associated with emotion was 
much higher for the moral-personal dilemmas than for moral-impersonal dilemmas, 
which again was somewhat higher than for non-moral ones. Areas associated with 
working memory, on the other hand, had little activity for moral-personal dilemmas, 
and considerable and similar activity for the two other types. This supports the 
conclusion that the brain works in different modes depending on the degree of 
emotionality of the questions; its activity seems to exhibit quite different patterns 
whether it is dealing with virtue-oriented dilemmas – which would correspond to path 
e in figure 3 – or consequentialistic problems, where pathway b-c-d would be active. 
Koenigs et al. [35] have followed this up by investigating how patients with focal 
bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) react to similar moral 
dilemmas. The VMPC is a brain region necessary for the normal generation of 
emotions and, in particular, social emotions. It turned out, for example, that they were 
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more willing to throw people off a life-boat than ordinary people. They revealed a 
pattern of abnormally high degree of consequential judgements on moral dilemmas 
when aggregate welfare was pitted against highly emotionally aversive behaviours, 
indicating that path e in figure 3 was disconnected.  
These findings lead us to expect that affect and emotions play important roles on 
conflict levels higher than level 1. On level 2 there are several stakeholders and 
instrumental decision criteria, which is reminiscent of moral impersonal situations 
(keeping money in a lost wallet). Could pure deliberation (pathway b-c-d-e) lead to an 
ethical result in this case? That depends on whether the DM would expect to feel 
better by restoring the wallet than not. That is possible, but shame (path e) would 
probably be more decisive. Conflict levels 3 and 4 have decision criteria that represent 
intrinsic values. The stakeholders do not take part in the decision process at level 3; 
they take part at level 4. These are akin to moral-personal dilemmas – we could think 
of resolving the question in secret of whether to throw somebody off the life-boat, or 
whether to negotiate with that person about being thrown overboard. From a 
consequentialistic point of view, somebody should be thrown overboard to save the 
others, but that may not happen. In many cases, virtue ethics enacted through affect 
would prevail – and this many would consider the most ethical outcome. Turning 
back to organizational decision-making, then, there is a risk for affect to play too great 
a role on conflict level 3, and the challenge is to apply reason to temper it. The risk is 
even higher on level 4, but since the stakeholders are participating in the process, it is 
possible to temper emotions through rules, as is commonly done in negations. In part 
eight, we will discuss discourse ethics as one promising avenue. 
7. OR, consequentialism and ethics  
It appears to be in the nature of OR analysts to seek to frame decision problems in 
terms of consequences that are to be optimized. Virtues and principles are seldom 
focused, and the applications tend to take place at low levels of conflict with 
correspondingly low levels of emotion. Is this good or is it bad? 
Consequentialism is different form the two other ethical platforms: While virtues are 
good, and principles we apply to protect important values are good by construction, 
consequences are value free. Consequentialist ethical theories agree on focusing on 
consequences. They differ with regard to what sort of good consequences they 
promote; in our context that would be stakeholder values created by the organizations. 
What in our opinion makes consequentialism an ethical theory is simply that it is good 
to be concerned about the consequences of actions. But that requires that one reflects 
on what sort of consequences count as good ones. And this begs the questions: Who is 
the primary beneficiary of moral action, and how are the consequences judged and 
who judges them? OR has something to offer here. It has expertise regarding 
development of value trees or goal hierarchies[24] and a bundle of techniques for 
enacting values in the decision process. But the underlying weakness is of course that 
subjective judgment, and thus tempered emotions, is necessary in all conflicts above 
level 0.  
To focus on consequences implies that one tries to steer issues away from conflicts 
that cause strong affect (path e) and towards deliberation (path a-b-c-d-e), thereby 
increasing the rationality of the process. This may sometimes even solve deadlocked 
situations where principles clash. It is important to note, however, that this still 
requires emotions, which is not commonly associated with consequentialism.[36] 
Thus, our concept of consequentialism entails tempered emotions. 
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Here are two well known ethical dilemmas that may serve to illustrate what it would 
entail to focus on consequences rather than virtues and principles. It is for the reader 
to judge whether this makes the approach more or less ethical. 
Abortion: a struggle is going on in many countries between pro-life and pro-choice 
forces. Pro-life people maintain that that abortion of live fetuses is a sin that must be 
avoided at all costs. The problem then arises of whether it is possible to specify 
exactly when life arises in the womb. This turns out to be a quite intractable problem, 
and the battle is instead heated by emotional pictures of fetuses, impelling pro-choice 
people to warn against mistaking feelings for ethics. A consequentialistic approach 
might be to attach a value to the fetus, representing its future potential. This would 
help turn the process from affect towards deliberation. But perhaps Billy Clinton had 
an even better idea when he coined the formulae that abortion should be “safe, legal 
and rare”.[37] These are three decision criteria that cater to three of the main 
stakeholders: pregnant women, the judiciary, and religious/moralist people. OR might 
assist at predicting the consequences of alternative laws, and weight the criteria 
through appropriate processes. Perhaps such an approach could break the deadlock in 
some countries. 
HIV containment: How to contain the spread of HIV is another problem that elicits 
strong emotions in stakeholders in many countries. One approach is to direct 
measures against especially contagious subgroups of the population, such as IV drug 
addicts, prostitutes, male homosexuals, and immigrant groups. For one thing, such 
measures would run against the rights of these people. A value focused MCDA was 
carried out in Norway that involved eliciting weights from a decision panel consisting 
of the three top national decision-makers to identify balanced measures against the 
spread of the virus. The two main opposing decision criteria were to avoid 
stigmatizing subgroups, and to prevent as many future AIDS cases as possible. The 
study ended up by considering immigrant from south of Sahara as a viable target 
group. This was later followed up by an official call to avoid sexual relations with this 
group. Although the decision panel found the consequential approach compelling, the 
resulting policy became highly controversial. To stigmatize a group of people like this 
is probably a violation of the article 12 of the 1948 United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights saying that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honor and reputation”. Articles in the prestigious journal the Lancet accused Norway 
for racism[38], and Norwegian health authorities answered back, defending the 
policy[39]. The intention was after all to save lives – so judgment of whether the 
policy was ethical or not, will depend on whether it is based on principles or 
consequences. But OR no doubt has the potential of enhancing the merits of a 
consequentialistic approach. 
We do not think that the question about the ethicality of consequentialism is simple, 
however. For one thing, consequentialism entails essentially that the ends sanctify the 
means, and this is a deeply discomforting principle for most people. 
8. Discourse ethics 
The term ‘discourse ethics’ derives from Latin discurro, which means running to and 
fro. In a dialogue, arguments go from one party to the other. When several participate 
in a discourse, it cannot rely on good will alone, by agreeing on disagreement among 
those involved. A practical discourse depends on certain abilities at the individual 
level, such as knowledgeable and responsible participants who respect each others 
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freedom and refrain from coercion, arguing rationally and finally focussing on a 
comprehensive solution, rather than privatized morals. 
According to Habermas discourse ethics must obey two principles, both in line with 
Kantian duty ethics. The first is the principle of universalization, a version of 
consequence-oriented reformulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: 
 
A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the interest and value–orientation of each individual could be jointly 
accepted by all concerned without coercion[40] 
 
The second is a specific principle for discourse ethics: 
 
Only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all 
concerned in practical discourse. 
 
Discourse ethics can be seen as a formalized concept, because it provides how a 
discourse should be accomplished – a practical discourse. Several standards have been 
developed that regulate discourse processes and ethical accounting, particularly for 
multinational corporations. A notable example is Social Accountability 8000 (SA 
8000). Decisive is that the premises for the “ideal speech situation” is normative and 
followed in a maximized extent, like truthful, without coercion, following the force of 
the best argument. As Gilbert et al. [40] remark, if practical discourse has been well 
performed, then failure to reach agreement on a conflicting norm means that the norm 
is not valid. This might be operationalized for OR like this: Only those decisions can 
claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all concerned in practical 
discourse. 
Discourse ethics do not lead however, to decision-making in a literal sense, like de-
cido, that means cutting through. DM in the sense of cutting through the Gordian 
knot, seems to be necessary, based on the ideological roots of modern management 
and its engineering foundations[41]. Yet, discourse ethics indicates that problems that 
comes from Greek pro-ballω – meaning cast before, project or to urge forward – do 
not mainly demand homo faber’s technical tools such as axes, but rather humanistic 
methods that we associate with solving a problem – and again from Latin, solvere 
means unloose. Discourse ethics solves problems by loosing up disagreement between 
the parties, rather than cutting through and thus hinder a discourse between involved 
parties. On the other hand, there is a balance between too far-reaching processes 
between involved stakeholders before DM, and no process at all. 
 
9. Concluding reflections: Ethical rules for OR analysis of value conflicts 
A belief is that an OR analyst is detached from a) emotions and b) personal and 
organizational responsibility. 
a) Emotions: In western Cartesian thought, science is about systematized rational 
knowledge, including moral philosophy, and that includes refraining from and 
suppressing emotions. The Kantian moral philosopher Robert Nozick claims that even 
if Darwin and Freud meant that human beings are not always guided by rational or 
even consciously known motives, humanity has a special status in the universe, based 
on its capacity for rationality. As a Kantian though, Nozick holds that instrumental 
rationality is insufficient. According to this concept of humanity, rationality is intent 
on noticing biases, including its own, by controlling and correcting these permanently 
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(Nozick 1993 xi). In Cartesian thought we find a “traditional suspicion of human 
emotion as something dark and dangerous, opposed to the objectivity sustaining 
power of reason.”[42]  
According to our discussion in part 6, we think, however, that an equilibrium between 
rationality and emotion is advisable, though always arbitrary, volatile or capricious. 
Emotion plays an important role in morals and ethics, including discourse ethics. 
Awareness and attention are important faculties for discourse ethics to reach solutions 
being accepted by all concerned without coercion or manipulation. Indeed, we do not 
think any moral philosophy is possible without embracing emotions. A pure rational 
decision maker without emotions like Damasio’s patient with a broken corpus 
callosum – connecting the left and right hemisphere of the brain[43] – seems to be 
even impeded from taking decisions. Further, persons with brain damage and reduced 
emotional capacity seem to have reduced capacity for ethical decision-making. E.g. 
persons with damage in prefrontal cortex and thereby reduced capacity for social 
emotions and resolving ethical conflicts seem to have increased tendency to 
consequentialistic decision-making and utilitarian moral judgments[35]. And 
impairment of social and moral behaviour is closely related to damage in human 
prefrontal cortex.[44]. Even a normal brain will not act adequately if looking at big 
numbers of an ongoing genocide through the media, although a small polar bear in a 
zoo, named Knut, might easily get empathy and support. Affect or lack of affect is 
decisive for action or lack of action. Therefore some will reject subjectivity in the 
name of science, claiming that emotions are a dark and dangerous power and 
therefore have nothing to do with moral philosophy and ethics. We claim that a 
fruitful balance between rationality/deliberation and emotion/affect is possible and 
desirable, even though fragile.  
b) Personal and organizational responsibility: At organizational level procedures may 
be established to compensate for rational and emotional weaknesses, but not as 
replacement for individual responsibility. A balance between individual and 
organizational responsibility is one side of the coin of ethical practical discourse. On 
the other side there is symmetry between emotional and rational abilities at individual 
level. Instead of pretending as if emotions are a non-existing part of humanity, 
emotionality is a faculty for improved fingerspitzgefühl in complicated processes 
between several disagreeing parties that have knowledge about each others 
preferences.  Empathy enhances potentiality to reach valid norms during a process of 
ethical discourse – norms that could be accepted by all stakeholders.  In a practical 
discourse emotional engagement is more commodious and felicitous than “pure” 
rational engagement.  
If the target though is to secure own moral group interests at the cost of others, we 
find it less advantageous to be emotional and empathetic, since emotionality might 
disturb group member’s ability to be focused exclusively on own interests. The other 
way around: Finding common ground when different parties contradict and have 
words on values will be facilitated if participants arouse emotional faculties, rather 
than suppressing them. If however emotional arousal bite off more than one can chew 
in a practical discourse, procedural mechanisms at organizational level will be 
necessitated.   
A difference between moral engagement for us and against them, and ethical 
engagement to find solutions accepted by all concerned, implies different challenges 
at individual and organizational level. In the first place, organizational level is remote 
and challenges at individual level are not so different from animals fighting about 
scarce resources, like food and water, acclaimed as survival of the fittest. In the 
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second place, Habermas’ principle of universalization and the principle of discourse 
ethics represent a huge challenge for individuals as well as organizations.  
This brings us to the following norms 1-5, which we see as valid for OR, according to 
practical discourse. An OR analyst who deals with decision problems that involve 
value conflicts should: 
 
1. Not regard herself as being detached from the decision that are made; she is 
ethically responsible. (Part 2) 
2. Promote the view that stakeholders have intrinsic value; they should not be 
treated instrumentally. (Part 5) 
3. Be conscious that good decision-making requires temperate emotions that 
balance affect and deliberation. (Part 6) 
4. Promote focus on consequences rather than virtues and rules. (Part 7) 
5. Encourage fair processes to identify stakeholder values. (Part 8) 
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